The British Army in Italy
The British Army in Italy is an article written by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle published in The Fortnightly Review in february 1927.
Editions
- in The Fortnightly Review (february 1927 [UK])
- in The British Campaign in Europe (1914-1918) (november 1928, Geoffrey Bles [UK])
The British Army in Italy
The recovery of the Italians from the crushing defeat of Caporetto was one of the finest exploits of the war. This battle began upon October 24th, 1917, and consisted in a determined attack by a combined German and Austrian Army upon the left wing of the Italians. If there was any tendency to criticise our Allies at the time it has long been silenced by our subsequent knowledge of the effect both upon British, French, and Portuguese lines of a concentrated assault with all the engines of modern warfare upon a limited front. In parts the Italian line held its position with great gallantry, but the enemy’s infantry flowed through the rifts, turned the flanks of the survivors, and finally swept the whole army back in such utter ruin that it was impossible for a time to say where it could be stopped. The line of the Tagliamento was abandoned, and at one time it seemed as if the retreat would be continued to the Po, and Venice fall once again into the hands of her ancient oppressors. Finally, however, an unstable equilibrium was established upon the banks of the Piave, where the right and centre of the Italian Army, which had escaped the full blast of the tornado, were able to build up a line of resistance.
The task of reconstruction was gigantic. The army had lost 800,000 men, 40,000 of whom were casualties, 265,000 were prisoners, and the remainder were fugitives and stragglers, most of whom were finally reassembled. Even more important was the loss of three thousand cannon and an immense amount of other military equipment. There was little time for reorganisation, for the enemy was pressing at their heels. However, the nation rose magnificently to the crisis. Military measures to stiffen the ranks and political measures to strengthen their morale were at once adopted, and by November 10th a solid wall of resistance had been built up under the supreme command of General Diaz.
In her dark hour the Italians naturally turned to their Allies for aid, and it was given with great promptitude. Six French divisions under Generals Maistre and Fayolles were at once despatched, and the same number of British divisions were under orders. The pressure upon the British line following the Cambrai action caused one of these to be detained. The other five, forming the Second British Army, under General Plumer, set off by rail and road upon their long journey. This army consisted of Haking's Eleventh and Cavan's Fourteenth Corps. The former contained the 5th and 41st Divisions. The latter was composed of the 7th, the 23rd, and the 48th. Early in December all these troops, together with the French, were actually in the line in the Montello section, which is near the centre where the mountainous stretch upon the north joins on to the broad plain which extends to the sea. As this sketch is limited in scope it must deal very superficially with the general operations, and concentrate upon the experiences of the. British contingent.
December was an anxious month, but from that time onwards the general line of defence became more stable. Save for a few raids across the Piave the British infantry were not engaged at all, but the artillery and especially the Air Force, under General Webb-Bowen, were of constant value to our Allies. During the winter the British aircraft brought down sixty-four of the enemy's machines, with a loss of twelve of their own.
In the early spring it became increasingly evident that a German attack upon a huge scale was about to break upon the Western front, and that every available man would be needed to meet it. In March General Plumer and the Eleventh Corps were recalled. Lord Cavan's three divisions were then assembled upon the edge of the Asiago Plateau, which is in the centre of the mountainous section of the defence. There was no protective river at this point, and the two armies lay face to face in a country of wooded hills with abrupt valleys. It may be taken as a compliment that the British were chosen to share the defence of this section of the line, for it was a very vital one. On the plain ground could be lost without any fatal result, but the mountain belt was a narrow one now, not more than a few miles in depth, and it would be fatal if the Allies lost their grip of it. They were already perilously near the edge. Field-Marshal Conrad, the Austrian commander, compared their situation to that of "a shipwrecked man clinging to a board, who would immediately sink were his fingers to be chopped off." The fingers in this instance were Monesi's 12th Italian Division upon the left, Fanshawe’s 48th, Shoubridge's 7th, and Babington's 23rd in the centre, with the 24th French Division upon the right. It was upon these that in the middle of June General Conrad tried his chop, with disastrous results — to the chopper.
This battle, which broke out in the early morning of June 15th, extended along the whole Italian line from the Astico in the mountains down to the marshes where the Piave finds its way into the Adriatic. It swung and swayed for several days, the Austrians having forced their way across the river at several points, and established bridge heads, which they defended with great tenacity. The Italian defence proved, however, to be too strong, and the discomfiture of the enemy was completed by the loyal Piave rising in their rear. At the end of a week they were all driven back, leaving 24,000 prisoners and seventy guns behind them. In this large action the British part was but a local engagement, but deserves some attention as being the first clash with the enemy.
The Austrian attack was carried out by four divisions upon a frontage of 8,000 yards. The two British divisions in the line were Fanshawe's 48th South Midland Territorials upon the left and Babington's 23rd upon the right. At three o'clock upon the morning of June 15th there broke out a severe bombardment of the front line, the communication trenches, and the rear positions by gas shells, heavy explosives, and shrapnel. At four o'clock the fire died down, but at six it was renewed, and shortly after seven the Austrian infantry could be seen, so far as vision was possible amid the dust and fumes, pouring down the Ambrosini Hill opposite and streaming forward to the assault.
This assault, so far as the 23rd Divisional part is concerned, may be easily described. It was, in most places, not so much repulsed as entirely nipped in the bud by the destructive fire of the 11th Sherwood Foresters, the 9th York and Lancasters, the 13th and 12th Durham Light Infantry, and the 11th Northumberland Fusiliers, which were the battalions, counting from the right, which manned the trenches. There were two points where the attack became dangerous, the one being opposite to the Sherwood Foresters. Aided by a French battalion of the 102nd Regiment, under Colonel Fargues, the Foresters had no difficulty in clearing their front, save at one point where the Austrians succeeded in occupying 150 yards of front trench. From this they debouched in an effort to increase their gains, but they were headed off by Colonel Hudson of the Foresters, with the personnel of the Headquarter Staff and a handful of brave Italian trench mortar gunners. These stopped the rush, though Colonel Hudson was himself wounded in the struggle. For a time the Austrians remained in the captured trench, but presently a concentrated attack was organised by a company of the 8th Yorkshire Light Infantry, who restored the position. From that moment the whole front of the 23rd Division was intact.
The other danger point was on the extreme left flank, where the 11th Northumberland Fusiliers might well have been involved in the troubles which had befallen the 48th Division if it had not thrown back a defensive flank under Major Gill, which by its rapid and accurate fire put a stop to that process of outflanking and rolling-up which is the dangerous sequel to a penetration, and had already made the trenches to the left untenable.
We have now to follow the more varied fortunes of the 48th Division. In their first rush, delivered swiftly and with determination, the Austrians had broken in upon two separate points. The first of these was on the extreme left, where, in spite of the spirited co-operation of the 11th Italian Division, the stormers effected a lodgment in the area defended by the 5th Warwicks. This battalion seems to have had a very long stretch committed to its care, and the two companies in the front trenches were scattered in thin groups along the line. The main break was at a small cluster of houses named Perghele, upon the right of the section. The fight here was severe, Major Bindloss, commanding the battalion, being killed, and Captain Watson wounded. The head of the Austrian storming column, after penetrating the line, turned to the south-east, that is, to their own left, and proceeded to outflank the next British unit upon the right. This was the 5th Gloucesters. The two companies in the trenches were enveloped, from both flank and rear, only about sixty fighting their way out. Even these could not have got away but for a gallant Lewis gunner, Private Oliver, who, in the words of the official report, sacrificed both his gun and himself in his successful endeavour to cover the retreat of his comrades.
Having in this fashion overwhelmed the Gloucesters, the Austrian wave now passed on through the woods, with a spray of rifle grenades and light machine-gun fire in front of them. They struck next upon the flank of the 4th Oxford and Bucks, who were the right-hand unit of the divisional front, and at the same time a party pushed in between the two divisions. After a stout resistance the Oxford men were driven from their trenches about nine o'clock, and in spite of a rally, in which they temporarily regained them, they were again driven back, although they had been reinforced by a company of the 4th Royal Berkshires. At 3.30 they established a line in front of their own regimental headquarters, some hundreds of yards to the rear, and this they held until the final victorious advance next morning. The enemy reports showed that no fewer than seven Austrian battalions attacked the Oxfords. Meanwhile the outflanking and rolling-up movement of the Austrians had lost its impetus and had been finally stopped by the company of the Northumberlands which had been thrown back as already described.
But, although the flank movement was stopped, there was none the less a gap 2,000 yards wide in the British line, through which the stormers were pushing, driving before them the straggling fringe of infantry which survived from the trenches. The farthest penetration of the Austrian wedge was about a thousand yards. With the foresight born of experience, two switch trenches, called respectively the Cesuna and the Lamerle, had been prepared for just such an emergency, and these became the rallying points for the defence.
The pressure was strongest upon the remains of the 5th Gloucesters, now reduced to less than two companies. Fired into from the front and flanks, they fell back through the woods. For a time the companies were separated, but about 1.30 they got into touch, and linked up also with the Warwicks upon their left. Three guns of the 102nd Battery came up to their help, partly manhandled by the infantry, and these, firing over open sights, did good work in restoring the line. This occurred in the area of the Lamerle switch, and the temporary line covered the space between this and a building upon the left, called the Casa del Guardiana. Three other Warwick battalions, the 6th, 7th, and 8th, had been ordered up to reinforce this line. A company of the 6th, under Captain Linfoot, pushed their way forward about midday as far as the battalion head-quarters of their comrades of the 5th, gallantly defended all day by Sergeant Townley and a handful of men. On the right also the battle was beginning slowly to turn. Colonel Knox, with the 7th Warwicks, carried the Guardiana House by storm, and Major Jardine brought up the 12th Battery R.F.A. to strengthen the British line, which began to advance slowly through the woods. The enemy in the pocket had, however, been strongly reinforced, and the results were still doubtful, though many scattered bodies seen to be passing back over No-Man's Land gave promise of victory and offered a tempting mark to the artillery.
As the afternoon advanced, however, the British predominance became more clearly established. Battalion after battalion came into action. The 6th Gloucesters and 7th Worcesters of Tomkinson’s 144th Brigade came up to help the 7th Warwicks, while the 4th Berkshires and 1st Bucks relieved the pressure upon the 5th Gloucesters. At 4.30 the broken point was still held by the enemy, but the pocket was being contracted on every side. Night fell with the British well up to their lost position and eager for an assault in the morning. When, however, that assault was delivered it was found that there was hardly any resistance, and that the enemy had fallen back to their own lines during the night. British patrols were pushed forward at once to explore the position, and some of the front Austrian trenches were found deserted, but a heavy barrage fell upon them and they were ordered back to their old line.
Such was the battle of the Asiago Plateau, a conflict which was honourable to both parties, and which displayed the respective national qualities of fiery courage upon the side of the Austrians and of dour, invincible persistence on that of the British. It was, of course, on a small scale compared with the great conflicts of France, but it was of vital strategic moment, since a break through would have imperilled the whole position. The losses give no indication of the real importance of the struggle. These losses upon the side of the British were 1,700,351 of whom were missing. The latter represent the two companies of Gloucesters who were cut off. As the average strength of the British battalions that day was under 500, the proportion of losses was a heavy one. Eleven hundred of the enemy were captured, and their casualty list was undoubtedly a high one. Seven mountain guns and seventy-two machine guns were among the trophies of the victors. The British reports were emphatic in their praise of those Italian batteries which were working in liaison with their own.
After this action there was quiet for some months upon the Asiago position, broken only by a series of infantry raids by the British upon the Austrian trenches, some of which were upon so large a scale that as many as 300 prisoners were captured upon a single occasion. The British flying service, under Colonel Joubert, had established during these months a marked ascendancy over their opponents, and the results obtained are said officially to have been higher in proportion to the strength employed than those in any theatre of war. Between March and October twenty-four British machines were lost, and during that time they destroyed 294 enemy aeroplanes and 9 balloons. The extreme pressure of the Germans in France had, however, a repercussion in Italy, as it was found necessary to further reinforce the Allied line in the West. The Italians, with great unselfishness, had already despatched their Second Corps for that purpose, and now a battalion was taken from each British brigade, nine battalions in all, and sent back across the Alps. There was a redistribution of troops also, by which the 48th Division, now under General Walker, was left on the Asiago position, while the 7th and 23rd were moved into the back areas ready to be transferred to the line when the great battle should be decided. Early in October an important change was made in the British dispositions. Lord Cavan was asked by General Diaz to take over the command of the 10th Anglo-Italian Army, which should include not only the 14th British but also the 11th Italian Corps. As a consequence General Babington became Corps Commander, and General Thuillier took his place at the head of the 23rd Division.
Great secrecy was observed as to the approaching attack, which was confidently expected to be a final one. The two British divisions were only moved up into the front line on October 21st, where they had their corps companions, the 11th Italians, upon their right. On their left was the 18th Italian Corps, forming the right unit of the 8th Italian Army. The general scheme was that three Italian Armies, the 12th, 8th, and 10th, should cross the Piave. Of these, the roth (Lord Cavan's) should hold Livenza between Portobuffole and Sicile. They should then act as a flank protection for the two armies upon their left, or up-stream, who should hinge upon the 10th and move northwards so as to drive a wedge between the 5th and 6th Austrian Armies and threaten their communications which ran through the Valmarino Valley. The whole operation was under the direct charge of General Caviglia, who commanded the 8th, or central, Army.
In the third week of October the British had been concentrated in the Treviso district, and their presence there was concealed as far as possible by the use of Italian uniforms for the outposts. It was clear that their task in crossing the river would be a very difficult one. The Piave at this point is a mile and a half wide, broken into numerous channels which flow with a considerable current between a number of islands, some of which are mere sand-banks, while others are of a considerable size. The largest of these was called the Grave di Papadopoli, which was three miles long and one mile broad. This was held by the Austrians as an advance post, and it was clear that the army could not cross until it was in British hands. This operation was carried out upon the night of October 23rd. Though small in itself, it was of vital importance to the general scheme, as no advance could be attempted until it had been carried through.
Twelve boats had been assembled, each of which was capable of holding six infantrymen in addition to two Italian pontiere, who rowed them. These Italian boat-men, together with the Italian officers who had been detailed to superintend them, were of great service during the operations. Shortly before midnight on October 23rd the men began to embark, but it was a most ticklish operation. The current ran strong and deep, there were two shoals in mid-stream which had to be waded, it took at the fastest some twenty minutes to get across, and the leading platoons had to be dumped on the shore and left to their. fate while the boats went back for more. The orders were that no shot should be fired, that the positions should be carried by the bayonet, and that the storming parties, landing at the extreme end of the island, should work down the line of the Austrian trenches, taking them all from the flank.
The operation was carried out by two units of the 22nd Brigade of the 7th Division, three companies of the Honourable Artillery Company furnishing the attacking party, while three companies of the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers were in support, the whole being under the command of Colonel O’Connor, of the former corps. All went well from the first. The surprise was complete. The first two platoons, under Lieut. Foster, crept in silence down the scattered line of Austrian posts and had occupied several hundred yards before the enemy realised what had befallen them and sent up their first frantic S.O.S. signals. By that time two whole companies of the H.A.C., under Captains Woollam and Garrard, were on the prowl, the one down the front and the other down the support trench. There was the usual confusion of direction inseparable from a night attack, but when day dawned the whole northern half of the island, with more than 200 of its defenders, was in British hands.
The river was fordable between the island and the Austrian lines, so that it was possible for them to pass over reinforcements and also to concentrate their fire upon that part of the island which had been cleared of their own people. So disproportionate were the numbers at some points of the straggling conflict that Austrian officers offered handsome terms of surrender to the British, assuring them that they would not be killed. The evening of the next day, however, saw the completion of the operations, 300 more prisoners had been taken, and the big stepping stone was cleared for the passage of the 14th Corps. Meanwhile the sappers had been working desperately upon the construction of a footbridge across the swollen, rushing torrent. Rain was falling heavily and the river rising, but in spite of all obstacles a narrow, swaying bridge had been erected by the 26th, and by the 27th the whole of the 7th Division was on the island. The occupation of this main island had made the general situation easier, and a second bridge had been constructed to a smaller island, the Lido, to facilitate the passage of the 23rd Division.
Early in the morning of October 27th the great advance began. It was to continue for days without a break, and was part of that conflict which was the final blow in the long duel between Italy and Austria. In the gray, cold, raining dawn, the British lines advanced to the attack. The river was waist-high, turbid and strong. The men were weighted with rifles, a hundred rounds of ammunition, trenching tools, food, overcoats and other needs. It was only by linking arms and shuffling their feet along the pebbly bottom that they could hold their places. Several were swept away and drowned. In front of them were zones of uncut wire with a line of trenches behind them. Nothing, however, could stop the inexorable advance.
Wading out through the shallows, the waterlogged, be-draggled stormers came first upon a broad belt of shingle which was spurting in all directions from the impact of the machine-gun bullets. Then came 200 yards of scrub, and then a long embankment ten feet high called "The Bund." Behind The Bund were the Austrian trenches, and in front the wire. On the right the leading battalions of the 7th Division were the 1st Gordons upon the flank and the 22nd Manchesters on the inner wing, the other battalions of each brigade being formed in depth behind them. The Gordons went forward with their accustomed dash, and found the wire rather more open than their comrades on the left. They carried The Bund with a rush and moved on to the second line of objectives, where they were held back for a time by the absence of the Italians on their right, who had been delayed by the failure of their bridge. It was at this time that the Gordons lost Colonel Ross and six officers, with many men. As soon as their flanks were secure, however, they dashed forward again, the men advancing in little groups under artillery formation until they had attained the farthest point marked out for the day’s attack. Here they were relieved by the 2nd Borderers, who had moved up in their support.
The 22nd Manchesters, upon their left, had also been held up by the wire, but Colonel English-Murphy, of the Staffordshires, moved swiftly forward to their assistance, and the two battalions smashed their way through the obstacle and carried The Bund. From there onwards they overran the Austrian position up to the limit which had been marked out as the extreme range of the protective barrage. Nearly 3,000 prisoners and fifteen guns had been secured by the 7th Division before evening.
The work of the 23rd Division upon the left was in some ways more onerous, for apart from the common obstacle of The Bund they had no flank protection upon the left. This had been anticipated, and a strong artillery support was provided upon that side, but none the less the handicap was a very heavy one.
The division advanced with four battalions in the line. They were, from right to left, the 8th Yorks, 10th West Riding, 12th Durham Light Infantry, and 11th Northumberland Fusiliers. Those on the right shared the fortunes and kept the general alignment of the 7th Division. It was different, however, upon the vulnerable left. Here the flank of the 11th Northumberland Fusiliers was fired into with deadly effect by the Austrian machine guns. Colonel Hill was killed, Major Gill was severely wounded, and soon every senior officer was down and the battalion, which had lost over 200 men, was led by Lieut. Robertson. The pressure was eased, however, by the action of the 10th Battalion of the same regiment. It had already spread out two companies to form a defensive flank, and one of these companies, gallantly led by Lieut. Wrighton, now rushed forward to thicken the thin array of the advancing line. This company had more than fifty casualties, but before evening the Fusiliers had also carried out the whole advance planned for the day.
On the 28th the whole line moved forward after a miserable night, in which the weary men, wet and chilled to the bone, tried to get snatches of sleep in the damp ditches or trenches in which they lay. But soon it was evident that complete success lay before them. In many cases there was no resistance at all. In others there were short, sharp fights round some strong point or machine-gun nest, which always ended in surrender when the flanks were turned. So demoralised had the enemy become that on the front of the 2nd Borderers a whole company surrendered to two men with a Lewis gun. The 104th Battery R.F.A. had in some miraculous fashion got across the river, and so had a number of Italian mountain guns, which were invaluable for breaking down the resistance in fortified buildings. The 56th Italian Division had now come into line on the left of the 23rd, so that the weak flank was at last protected. The Monticano River afforded a strong line of resistance, but the bridges were seized by the rapid advance of the scanty corps cavalry, consisting of the North Hants Yeomanry and the 14th Cyclists. This daring little body, under Colonel Lowther, reached the town of Sicile on the 29th and actually caused 2,000 Austrian infantry to hold up their hands, until at last they realised the weakness of these impudent assailants and drove them for the moment out of the town. One fine deed of arms signalised the crossing of the Monticano. The 12th Durhams had crossed and were held up under heavy fire from a fortified Austrian position. The 11th Northumberland Fusiliers joined up upon their left, attacked across 300 yards of open, cleared the whole front in a final rush, bayoneted four officers and seventy men of the Austrian garrison, and secured 156 prisoners.
Once the River Monticano was passed, an operation which was facilitated by the gallantry of the 8th Yorkshires, the battle became a rout, and the whole Austrian front dissolved into ruin. From that time onwards it was no longer a chronicle of fighting but rather an inventory of captures. The weary British divisions which had been marching and fighting for three days were replaced by fresh Italian troops, who continued the pursuit across the Livenza and up to the Tagliamento, the forcing of which gave its baptism of fire to the 332nd American regiment, the only American troops in Italy. On the evening of November 3rd the white flag went up, and on the 4th Austria had declared an armistice, and the war at this point had reached its victorious end.
In the whole action the British losses were not severe. Those of the 23rd Division were 1,000, of which an undue proportion fell upon the 11th Northumberland Fusiliers. The 7th Divisional losses were rather less. The number of prisoners taken was 28,000, with 210 guns.
Walker's 48th Division upon the Asiago front had been much stimulated by the good news from the south, and the 12th Italian Corps were straining on their leash, Italians, British and French, to break the line which had confronted them so long. The main Austrian trench position at this point was called the Winter-Stellung, and this was very strongly held and formidable in every way. It was argued, however, that the weakening in the south must produce a corresponding reaction in the north. It was therefore determined that an attack should be made. So far as the British division was concerned, this advance was carried out by the 1st Bucks and 4th Berkshires of the 145th Brigade on the right, and by the 4th and 6th Gloucesters of the 144th Brigade upon the left. The Gloucesters were held up by intense fire and made no progress, but the night attack was so successful that General Walker determined to throw his whole weight in that direction. The 7th Worcesters were sent up to support the movement, and the 143rd Brigade was assembled in support. Early on November 2nd the new attack was launched and was completely successful, the 7th Worcesters and 4th Oxfords carrying all before them and causing the evacuation of those trenches upon the left which had held up the Gloucesters upon the previous day. The Oxfords, among other exploits, reached the cloud-capped summit of Mt. Nicatta, 6,000 feet above the sea, and captured after a sharp fight the 100 Austrians who formed the garrison.
The way being cleared, the 143rd Brigade at once began to advance down the Val d'Assa, one of the most important of those rocky corridors which lead to the central town of Trent, capital of all that mountain district. The roads had been broken up, but the 474th and 475th Companies of Royal Engineers soon repaired the mischief, and the advance was amazingly rapid. It was rumoured that the Austrians would make a last desperate stand in the gate of the pass. In the morning, however, this menace dissolved into nothing, the opposition was brushed aside, and 14 Austrian battalions with the 3rd Corps Commander and three divisional generals were surrounded and captured. The same evening the white flag went up, and the 48th Division was in the same victorious position as its comrades in the south. Its success had been great, but it had been shared by the 24th French Division, on its right, and by the 30th Italians, on its left. Its chief trouble now was how to handle the enormous mass of prisoners, and, above all, how to feed them. Colonel Barnett, in his 48th Division in Italy, has given an excellent account of the situation, and also of the steps which he and others took to meet it. When one remembers that the British line was at that time seventy miles from railhead, that this distance was filled with rugged mountains and valleys, and that the swift advance, so necessary for military reasons, could not have been foreseen and prepared for, one wonders that the strain was not too great for those who had to meet it. Altogether it was a remarkable performance, which, like many other wonderful things, was lost sight of in view of the gigantic, overwhelming fact of the Armistice. The Duke of Braganza, who commanded the 6th Austrian Cavalry Division, is quoted as having spoken of the "wonderful marching powers of the 48th Division," and added that the feat of Walker's men would be recorded in military history.
