The British Campaign in France (february 1919)
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(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 103)
Cambrai. The Second Phase. is the 21th article, published in february 1919, in a series of 21 articles written by Arthur Conan Doyle serialized as The British Campaign in France in The Strand Magazine.
Editions
- in The Strand Magazine (february 1919 [UK]) (1 ill. + 1 map + 1 diagram)
- in The British Campaign in France and Flanders (1916-1920, Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. [UK])
- in The British Campaign in France and Flanders (1916, George H. Doran Co. [US])
- in The British Campaign in Europe (1914-1918) (november 1928, Geoffrey Bles [UK])
Illustrations
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Battle order of third army. Cambrai, Nov. 30th 1917.
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One of the most heroic episodes of the war — the fight to death of the Essex men at Moeuvres.
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The scene of the fighting described in the present instalment.
Cambrai. The Second Phase.

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 103)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 104)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 105)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 106)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 107)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 108)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 109)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 110)

(The Strand Magazine, february 1919, p. 111)
The sudden change which made this battle the most dramatic in the war.
By
A. CONAN DOYLE.
A Whirlwind Attack — The Rally — Desperate Defence of the Twenty-ninth Division — Guards to the Rescue — The Northern Attack — A Slaughter of Germans — The Results.
It was clear before the end of November, 1917, to the British Commanders that the enemy had grown so strong that the initiative had passed to him, and that instead of following up attacks it was a question now of defending positions against a determined endeavour to shove back the intruders and splice the broken line. The multifarious signs of activity behind the German lines, the massing of troops, the planting of batteries, and the registration of ranges all warned the experienced observers that a great counter-offensive was about to begin. There was no question of a surprise at any point of the line, but Bourlon was naturally the place whore the enemy might be expected to be at his full strength, since it was vital that he should regain that position. At the same time it was clearly seen that the storm would break also at the south end of the line, and General Snow had given every instruction to the G.O.C. Fifty-fifth Division, which held the position next to the scene of action. The experienced leader took every step which could be thought of, but he was sadly handicapped by the state of his division, which had been so severely hammered at Ypres, and had in the last few days had one brigade knocked to pieces at Knoll. With only two brigades, full of young troops who had taken the place of the casualties incurred in the north, he had to cover at least ten thousand yards of ground. We will begin by endeavouring to follow what occurred in this southern sector, and then turn to the equally important, though less dramatic, doings in the north.
The attack in the south was delivered upon a front of ten miles from Vendhuille in the south to Masnières in the north.
A Whirlwind Attack.
Shortly after seven in the morning the tempest suddenly broke loose. The surprise was so well carried out that, though the British General was expecting an attack, and though he had his wire patrols pushed up to the German trenches only a hundred yards off, still their reports at dawn gave no warning of any sound to herald the coming rush. It came like a clap of thunder. An experienced officer in the front British trench said: "My first impression was that of an earthquake. Then it seemed to me that an endless procession of aeroplanes were grazing my head with their wheels. On recovering from the first shock of my surprise the Germans were far behind me." There was no question of protective barrage, for the quickest answer to the most urgent S.O.S. would have, been too late to help.
This account refers particularly to the 166th Brigade, upon the left of the Fifty-fifth Division, which got the full blast of the storm. It and the guns behind it were overrun in an instant by the weight and speed of the advance. The general in command did all that could be done in such an emergency, but it was impossible to form a fixed line. The alternative was to swing back, hinging upon the right of the division, and this was done. so that there was always a flank formed upon the left of the stormers. There was a ravine, called Ravine 22 upon the maps, which ran down between the Fifty-fifth and Twelfth Divisions. With the terrific force of a flood the Germans poured down this natural runway, destroying the British formations upon each side of it. The Fifty-fifth Division was shattered to pieces at this point by so terrific an impact upon their feeble line, but the small, groups into which they were broken put up as good a fight as they could, while the line formed anew between the village of Villers-Guislain and the farm Vaucelette, which was a strong pivot of resistance. In this part of the field units of the l65th Brigade of Liverpool battalions, together with the 5th Royal Lancasters and the 10th Liverpool Scottish, of the 166th Brigade, stood stoutly to their work, and though the enemy, after penetrating the lines, were able to get the village of Villers-Guislain, which they had turned and surrounded, they were never able to extend their advance to the south on account of this new line of defence through Vaucelette, though It was composed entirely of infantry with no artillery support. However, even with this limitation, the situation was bad enough, since the 166th Brigade was almost cut to pieces; upon the extreme left one battalion, the 5th South Lancashires, was nearly destroyed. Of the division generally, it was said by a higher general that "they fought like tigers," as might be expected of men who had left a great name on the battle of Ypres, and who were destined for even greater fame when four months later they hold Givenchy at the critical moment of the terrible battle of Armentieres. Here, as always, it is constancy in moments of adversity and dour refusal to accept defeat which distinguishes both the British soldier and his leaders.
We shall now see what happened to the Twelfth Division upon the left of the Fifty-fifth. When the German stormers poured down Ravine 22 their left-handed blow knocked out the 166th Brigade, while their right hand crushed in the side of this division. From the ravine in the south to Quarry Farm in the north the German infantry surged round the position like a mountain spate round some rock-hearted islet, where the edges might crumble and be washed out by the torrent, but the solid core would always beat back the waters. The line of the division was a curved one. with the 35th Brigade upon the right, the 36th in the centre, and the 37th upon the left. It was the right-hand brigade upon which the storm burst with its full, shattering force.
The 7th Suffolks, next to the fatal ravine, shared the fate of the 5th South Lancashires upon the southern edge of it. By a coincidence the colonel had been invalided for appendicitis the day before, but Major Henty, who was in command, was killed. The 5th Berks and 9th Essex, broken up into small parties and enveloped in a smoke cloud through which they could only catch dim glimpses of rushing Germans, were pushed back to the north and west, still keeping some sort of cohesion, until they reached the neighbourhood of Bleak House, where they rallied once more and gathered for a counter-attack. Everywhere over this area small parties were holding on, each unconscious of all that was passing outside its own little smoke-girt circle. Close to Villers-Guislain upon the south side of the ravine Sapper Company 70, together with the 5th Northampton Pioneers, held on bravely for many hours, shooting into the flank of the German advance, who poured over the British gun positions, which were well forward at this point in order to support the troops in Masnières and Marcoing. Some of the incidents round the guns were epic in character, for the British gunner does not lightly take leave of his piece. Many were fought to the last instant, their crews hacking at them with pickaxes and trenching tools to disable them even while the Germans swarmed in. Lieutenant Wallace, of the 363rd Battery, with five men, served three guns point-blank, their trails crossing as they covered three separate fields of fire. Each of this band of heroes received a decoration, their leader getting the V.C. The 92nd R.F.A., near La Vacquerie, also repulsed four separate attacks, firing with open sights at a range of two hundred yards before they were forced to dismantle their guns and retire.
The 7th Norfolks, on the left edge of the 35th Brigade, were farthest from the storm centre and stoutly beat off all attacks. Only one lieutenant was left upon his feet at the end of the day. Separated from their comrades the Norfolks were rather part of the 36th Brigade upon their left, who were also fiercely attacked, but were more happily situated as regarded their flank. The 9th Royal Fusiliers were pushed back to the Cambrai Road on the north, but with some of the Norfolks built up a solid line of resistance there. Next to them upon the left the two companies of the 8th Royal Fusiliers, which were in the line, lost very heavily, in spite of a splendid attempt to rescue them made by the other two companies led by their heroic colonel, Elliott Cooper. In this brave effort the leader gained his Victoria Cross, but also unhappily a wound from which he eventually died. This counter-attack drove the Germans back for the first time in this terrible morning, but their lines were reinforced and they came on once more.
The 37th Brigade upon the left had their own set of troubles to contend with. The Germans had beaten hard upon the neighbouring Twentieth Division, breaking into their line upon the right of the flank 59th Brigade. In this way they got into Lateau Wood and on to the Bonavis Ridge, which placed them upon the left rear of the 37th Brigade. The unit was in imminent danger of being cut off, but held strongly to its line, the pressure falling particularly heavily upon the 7th East Surreys and upon the 6th Buffs. Pam-Pam Farm was the centre of some very desperate fighting on the part of these two units. The brigade was sorely tried and forced backwards, but still held its own, facing upon two and even three different fronts, as the enemy drifted in from the north and east.
The Rally.
In the meantime a train of independent circumstances had built up a reserve line which was destined to be of great importance in limiting the German advance until reinforcements could arrive. Their stormers had within an hour or two reached not only Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu, but had even entered Gouzeaucourt, three miles deep in the British line. This village, or rather a quarry upon its eastern edge, was the headquarters of the Twenty-ninth Division, and the Germans were within an ace of capturing its famous commander, General De Lisle. The amazed commandant of the local hospital found a German sentry at his door instead of a British one, and with the usual British good-humour sent him out a cup of tea. No doubt he did the same to the Irish Guardsman who in turn relieved the German in the afternoon. Captain Crow, of the Staff, was killed. The G.O.C. Division, General De Lisle, with quick decision organized a temporary defence for the south end of the village, and then hurried up to join his hard-pressed men at Marcoing. The G.O.C. Twelfth Division, General Scott, a veteran of many battles, had energetically hurried up the two battalions which he held in reserve. They were the 6th West Surreys and the 11th Middlesex. Some hundreds of odds-and-ends near headquarters were also formed into a unit and pushed to the front. These went forward towards the firing with the vaguest notion of the situation, meeting broken groups of men and catching occasional glimpses of advancing Germans. The G.O.C. of the 35th Brigade, General Vincent, had been nearly caught in Gonnelieu, and found the enemy between him and his men. As he came back with-his Staff, pausing occasionally to fire at the advancing Germans, he passed Gauche Wood, and there met the advancing battalions, which he helped to marshal along a low ridge, the Revelon Ridge. The Northumberland Hussars lined up on the right of these troops, and two brigades of cavalry coming up from the south formed on the left of them at a later hour. The whole held firm against all enemy attacks and made a bulwark until the time when the Guards advanced in the afternoon. When that event occurred this Revelon line formed roughly a prolongation of the new line established by the Guards and Cavalry, so that a long dam was formed. Commanding officers in this critical part of the field gave a sigh of relief in the early afternoon as they realized that the worst was over.
Douglas Smith's Twentieth Light Division was on the left of the Twelfth, and its experience was equally trying. It was upon the riflemen of the 59th Brigade that the main shock fell, and it came with such sudden violence that the Germans were through the right unit and in the rear of the rest before the situation was fully realized. The 61st Brigade upon the left had also a most desperate time, their flank being penetrated and turned so that for a time they were cut off from their comrades of the Twenty-ninth Division at Masnières. By this determined German attack the south bank of the Canal was partially cleared for their advance, which put them in the position that they could push along that bank and get hold of Les Rues Vertes and the southern ends of the bridges so as to cut off those British troops who were across the Canal. In this dangerous movement they nearly had success, and it was only the desperate fighting of some of the 86th Brigade which saved the situation. The prospects were even worse upon the right of the division, for the Germans broke through Lateau Wood, and so got completely behind the 10th K.R.R., who were the flank battalion. From the desperate struggle which ensued only few ever emerged, for the battalion was attacked on three sides and was overwhelmed after a long and splendid defence, which twice repulsed heavy frontal attacks before the flank advance rolled up the line. The battalion got separated from its own headquarters in Lateau Wood. and the O.C., Colonel Sheepshanks, with the twenty odd men who composed the Staff, fought a little battle of its own against the stormers coming down towards the Bonavis-Masnières Road. The survivors of the brigade rallied upon the reserve battalion, the 11th R.B. on the Hindenburg Line. The 11th K.R.R., on the left of the brigade front, had endured a similar experience, but their losses were not so terribly severe. The aeroplane attack worried the troops almost as much as the infantry, so that it is no exaggeration to say that there were times when they were assailed from four sides, the front, each flank, and above at the same instant. These aeroplanes gave the impression of being armour-clad and invulnerable to rifle-fire.
Desperate Defence of the Twenty-Ninth Division.
Upon the left of the Twentieth Division, with its centre at the village of Masnières, was the Twenty-ninth Division, a good unit to have in the heart of such a crisis. The Twenty-ninth and Sixth Divisions held the centre of the British line that day and wore the solid nucleus upon which the whole battle hinged both to left and right of them. Both divisions were taken in reverse, but they held the whole of their ground without giving an inch and completely beat off every German attack. A Guernsey battalion made its mark in the fighting that day and rendered most excellent service, as did the Newfoundlanders; but the main strength of the divisions lay, of course, in their disciplined British veterans, men whose war-hardened faces, whether in Gallipoli or Flanders, had never been turned-from an enemy. It is no light matter to drive such a force, and the four German divisions who drove in from Masnières to Bauteaux were unable to make even a dint in that formidable line. For two days the villages, both Marcoing and Masnières, were firmly held, and when at last a readjustment of the line was ordered it was carried out voluntarily and deliberately in accordance with the new plans made necessary by the events in north and south.
In this great fight the 86th Brigade was on the right at Masnières with the 16th Middlesex upon the right, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers upon the left, and the 2nd Royal Fusiliers by the sugar factory east of the village — details which have been rescued by the industry of Mr. Percival Phillips. The 87th Brigade extended to the left, covering a wide front as far as the Cambrai Road. The 1st Inniskillings were on their right, the 1st Borderers on their left, and the 2nd South Wales Borderers in support. The 88th Brigade was in reserve at the time of the attack, but quickly moved up and was in the heart of the subsequent fighting.
Masses of German infantry wore reported at Crevecoeur, and within a very short time a rush of grey infantry was swirling down past the flank of the Middlesex men, and breaking the connection with the Twentieth Division on the right. Some of the assailants got along the south bank and actually seized Les Rues Vertes at the same moment that a counter-attack by the Guernsey men swept into the village and drove them out again. This was a really vital point, as the capture and retention of the village would have been most serious. Many soldierly actions were performed in this clash of arms, showing that the mechanical side of modern warfare can never quite eliminate the brave pushing heart and the strong arm. Captain Gee, of the Staff, among others rescued an ammunition dump, armed with a revolver and with a heavy stick with which he beat down all opposition at the cost of a serious wound to himself — a fair price to pay for a subsequent V.C. The Germans were foiled for the moment, but they had found the weak spot in the line, and all day they hammered at it with characteristic tenacity, while all day the men of the Twenty-ninth stood up to one attack after another, their dwindling line fraying to the last degree but never breaking before the enemy. Les Rues Vertes became a Golgotha of Germans, but it was still in the evening safe in the hands of the British defenders. One of the classical examples of British courage and discipline during the war, fit to rank with Colonel Pears and his cancer at Ovillers, was furnished by Colonel Forbes Robertson, of the 16th Middlesex, now a V.C., who, stricken in both eyes and temporarily blind, was still led by his orderly up and down the line in order to steady it. Let such a story help our descendants to realize the kind of men who stood between Germany and the conquest of the world.
Next morning saw no surcease of the fighting in this quarter of the field. If anything, the ranks of the assailants were thicker and their rushes more insistent upon the morning of the 2lst. But the Twenty-ninth had called up its reserves, and stood with every bristle on end across the German path. The trouble behind the line had greatly weakened the artillery support, but the trench mortars gave all the help possible to the hard-worked infantry. The villages were knocked to pieces by the enemy guns, but the British stuck like leeches to the ruins. The Brigadier of the 86th Brigade was among his men in the front of the battle, encouraging them to dwell upon their aim and steadying their weary ranks. The 87th Brigade, in the north, though itself attacked, spared some reinforcements for the hard-pressed men in the south. Once Les Rues Vertes was lost, but a counter-attack won it back again. This was still the position when, on the night of December 1st, the orders were given for the general re-adjustment of the line by the evacuation of the Masnières Salient. Well might Sir Douglas Haig send a special order to the G.O.C., General De Lisle, thanking him for the magnificent services rendered during two days and a night by the Twenty-ninth Division.
Guards to the Rescue.
The Guards, who had been drawn out after their hard spell of service in the Bourlon attack, were moving into a rest-camp behind the lines when they were stopped by the amazing tidings that the British line was broken, and that the Germans were scattered anywhere over the undulating country in front of them. It was eleven-fifteen, and they were marching from the hamlet of Metz when the first news of disaster reached them — news which was very quickly followed by signs, as gunners were met coming back with the sights and sometimes the broken breech-blocks of their abandoned guns in their hands. Over the ridge between Metz and the Gouzeaucourt Wood a number of gunners, sappers, and infantry came in driblets, none of them hurrying, but all with a bewildered air as though uncertain what to do. To these worried and broken people the sight of the taut lines of the Guards must indeed have been a great stay in their trouble. The Guards moved forward in the direction of the turmoil, but their progress was slow, as there were gun-teams upon the narrow road. The first brigade was leading, being the unit which had suffered least in the Bourlon fighting. The young Brigadier, General de Crespigny, a dashing but cool-headed soldier, galloped ahead in an effort to clear up the situation, and after doing a mile or so across country he suddenly saw the grey coats of German infantry among the trees around him. Riding back, he halted his brigade in a hollow by Gouzeaucourt Wood, fixed bayonets, and then, deploying them into the line, advanced them in extended order across the fields. From in front there came an occasional shell, with the constant cracking of machine-guns, which increased as they topped the low ridge before them. "We advanced into the blue in perfect lines," says one who was present. Once under fire the brigade went forward in short rushes of alternate companies. "Our fellows were not shouting," says the same witness, "but chatting among themselves, and smiling in a manner that boded in for the Huns." The 2nd Coldstreams were on the right, the 3rd in the centre, and the 1st Irish upon the left, with the 2nd Grenadiers in close support. As the brigade came upon the fringes of the German advance they swept them up before them, keeping the Metz Gouzeaucourt Road as their right boundary, while a force of dismounted cavalry moved up upon the farther side. The Irish upon the left passed through the wood, and broke with a yell about 2 p.m. into Gouzeaucourt Village, which was not strongly held. The Germans bolted from the eastern exits, and the Guardsmen passing through made a line beyond, getting in touch upon the left with the 4th Grenadier Guards of the 3rd Brigade, which formed up and advanced upon that side. They were aided in this advance by a small detached body representing the Headquarters Guard of the Twenty-ninth Division and by a company of North Midland R.E., who held their post inviolate all day, and were now very glad to join in an offensive. As they advanced, beyond the village they came into a very heavy fire, for the St. Quentin Ridge faced them, and it bristled with machine-guns, field-guns, and 59's were also playing upon them, but nothing could check that fine advance, which was in time to save a number of heavy guns which could by no possibility be removed. It was itself aided in the later stages by a brigade of guns of the 47th London Division, which swung into action straight from the line of march and did good service in supporting the attack. By nightfall the total ground gained was over two miles in depth, and a definite line of Guardsmen and cavalry covered all this section of the field, limiting and denning the German advance. General Byng must surely have breathed more freely when the good news reached his head-quarters, for, but for this energetic operation, there was nothing to prevent the Germans flooding into the country behind and getting to the rear of the whole northern portion of the Third Army.
The further operations of the Guards upon, the next morning can only be given in a more extended account; meanwhile we may say of these operations that they were the first truly successful offensive on a large scale which the enemy had made since the gas attack upon April 22nd, 1915, nearly two and a half years before, and it would be a sign of a poor spirit if we did not admit it, and applaud the deftness and courage of the attack.
The Northern Attack.
We shall now turn to the northern sector, which extends from Tadpole Copse, upon the left, to that solid centre of resistance furnished by the two veteran divisions at Marcoing and at Masnières. It was upon the left of this curve that the German attack broke upon November 30th from the Hindenburg Line to the village of Fontaine, a front of about six miles. The attack, which began about nine o'clock, differed from that on the south, because the element of surprise was wanting and because the ground was such that the attacking troops could be plainly seen. The final result was to push back the British 1ine, but this was mainly as a readjustment to correspond to the change in the south. To effect this small result all accounts are agreed in stating that the Germans incurred such murderous losses that it is improbable that any have been more severe since the early days of the war. If on the balance the British lost the day in the south they gained it in the north, for, with limited loss to themselves, they inflicted most severe punishment upon the enemy.
The arrangement of the troops upon the northern curve of the battle line was as follows. Forming a defensive flank between the old British line and Tadpole Copse was the 168th Brigade, and to its right, facing Moeuvres, the 169th Brigade, both of them of the Fifty-sixth London Territorial Division, which had been a week in the fighting line and was very worn. Next to them, upon the right, was the Second Regular Division, from Moeuvres to Bourlon, with elements of the 5th, 6th, and 94th Brigades in front. Upon their right was the Forty-seventh London Territorial Division, occupying the line drawn through Bourlon Wood. Upon their right again were the Fifty-ninth South Midland Territorials, near Fontaine, who in turn linked up with the left of the Sixth Division, thus completing the semicircle of battle.
A Slaughter of Germans.
After a short but very severe bombardment the German infantry advanced upon the line from Tadpole Copse to Bourlon Wood, a front of about four miles. There were four fresh German divisions, with three others in reserve, and the attack was driven on with the utmost resolution, falling upon the outlying British outposts with a force which often destroyed them, although the furious resistance of these scattered bodies of men took all the edge off the onslaught. It was also beaten into the earth by the British artillery, which had wonderfully fine targets as the stormers in successive lines came pouring over the open ground between Moeuvres and Bourlon. The artillery of the Fiftieth Division had been left in the line, and a gunner officer of this unit described now his guns swung round and enfiladed the German attack upon the right as it stormed up to the line of the Forty-seventh Division. "It was one Howitzer battery, D. 178, that first tumbled to the fact that the Boches were attacking, and had driven in some of the Second Division posts. This battery swung its guns round at right angles, getting on to the advancing enemy in enfilade and over open sights. Every other battery in the country opened within five minutes." Every observer agrees that the targets were wonderful, and that it was only in places where the ground gave him protection that the German, storm troops could reach the expectant British infantry, who received him with such a murderous fire of rifles and Lewis guns that his dead were heaped thickly along the whole front.
Taking the action from the left, the outposts of the 169th Brigade were driven in, but put up a series of desperate fights. From Moeuvres to Tadpole Copse the action raged, and then extending round the British left wing the enemy poured out from the back of that portion of the Hindenburg Line which ran upon the flank of the 168th Brigade, so that both units were involved in heavy fighting, with a limited field of fire which gave fewer advantages to the defence than were found on the rest of the line. The "Westminsters, the London Scottish, the Post Office Rifles, and the 2nd Londons all bore themselves with special bravery in a long day of desperate fighting, during which commanding officers were in at least one instance compelled to stand, bomb in hand, defending their own headquarters. It was a grim battle and the losses were heavy, coming upon troops which had already lost enough to shake the moral of any ordinary infantry; but the thin ranks held firm and the positions were retained. At one time the Germans were round the right flank of the 169th Brigade, and so cut off a company of the 13th Essex. There is a wonderfully dour military spirit amongst these East Saxons. It was an anxious situation, and it was saved by the utter self-abnegation of the company in question, who held a hurried council of war in which they swore to fight to the death. This grim gathering, which might furnish a theme for a great artist, consisted of Captain "Robinson, Lieutenant Corps, Sergeant-Major Edwards, Platoon Sergeants Phillips, Parsons, Fairbrass, Lodge, and Legg. With a hand-clasp they returned to their work, and during the whole night their rifle-fire could be heard, though no help could reach them. In the morning they lay with their faces to the sky and their men around them, all true to their vow to death. It is a story to remember.
The left flank of the Second Division was held by this same 13th Essex, the 2nd South Stafford, and 17th Middlesex Battalions of the 6th Brigade. This brigade was cut into two parts by the Canal du Nord, a huge trough of brickwork without any water, eighty feet across, with steep sloping sides. The bridges across were swept by German fire, and the only transit was by ropes to help the climber. All day the fight raged furiously here, the Germans within bombing distance of the defence, which was never penetrated for an instant. Save for one small isolated trench, with about seventy men, this whole line held firm against every form of attack.
Snipers and bombers fired across from bank to bank, while down in the dried bed of the Canal there was constant close-range fighting. All night the difficult post was held, as was the line on the extreme left, where the 17th Middlesex were bowling back every attack with their well-sustained fire. There was no more wonderful individual record in the battle than that of Captain MacReady-Diarmid, of the 17th Middlesex, who fought like a d'Artagnan of Romance, and is said to have killed some eighty of the enemy in two days of fighting before he himself at last met that fate from which he had never shrunk. A V.C. was assigned to his family.
On the right of the 6th Brigade was the 99th Brigade, the victors of Delville Wood, who were also furiously engaged, meeting such waves of German infantry as were able to get past the zone of the British barrage. German field-guns unlimbered suddenly on the crest looking down on the British lines only a few hundred yards off. The crews were shot down so swiftly that only one gun got back in three rounds. Then there came a rush of two battalions in full marching order, debouching in fours from Bourlon Village, and deploying in the open. These also were shot to bits. The whole front of the brigade was dotted with broken guns and huddled grey figures, while many despairing of getting back threw up their hands and sought refuge in the British lines Battalion after battalion was thrown in at this point until the best part of a division was spread bleeding over some twenty acres of ground. The three battalions chiefly engaged, the 1st Berkshires, 17th Royal Fusiliers, and 1st Rifles, from right to left, had such a day as trench warfare could never afford.
At the outset the force of the attack pressed back the 1st Berkshires, upon the right, together with the left wing of the Forty-seventh Division. For a few moments the situation was alarming. However, after three hours of ding-dong fighting, the volume of fire was too much for the stormers, and they fell back. At the same time the 17th Royal Fusiliers, who had rallied under cover of their outposts, shot down everything in front of them. The 1st K.R.R. had a day of wonderful fighting — snipers, rifle grenadiers, Lewis gunners, and machine gunners were all equally glutted with slaughter. "The Germans in mass formation came on in waves offering a splendid target at a range of from fifteen hundred yards to point-blank. In addition, they were enfiladed by the machine gunners and subjected to very heavy fire from our guns for two and a half hours. The second attempt never looked like succeeding and was smothered in a very short time."
The 17th Royals have been mentioned as being in the line at this point, though they really belonged to the 5th Brigade. The fact was that in a previous operation they had won a long trench advancing at right-angles to the British position and leading up to the Germans. This was called the Rat's Tail on account of its shape,
and it was still occupied by the Royals when the attack broke out, so that they were placed in a most difficult position and were pressed back down this long trench fighting a desperate rear-guard action, as will be told later. Their presence in the Rat's Tail was the more unfortunate as it helped to screen the Germans and to contract the fire-field of the main line behind them. After clearing the Rat's Tail the remains of the battalion found themselves upon the right of the 1st K.R.R.
The remaining brigade of the division, the 5th, had some of its men also in the front line and as busy aa its comrades. It is stated in the account already quoted that even the wounded men of the 2nd H.L.I. were propped up, so that they might continue to fire upon the Germans. It was a brigade which had suffered many an evil quarter of an hour in the past, and it is no wonder that the men took a fierce joy in such a fight when at last they could meet their hated enemy face to face. Side by side with the Highlanders were those veterans of 1914, the 2nd Oxford and Bucks, the battalion that broke the Prussian Guard. They also had many an arrear to wipe off, nor were their less experienced comrades of the Royal Fusiliers less intent upon the work in hand. It was a costly experience for the War-Lord and his legions.
In the evening, save for the one loss at the Canal Lock. which has been. already recorded, the whole three-thousand-five-hundred-yard front of the Second Division stood inviolate, and was clearly defined when the British force withdrew by the thick pile of German dead which marked it. Indeed, it is claimed that at the end of the day the posts which were thrown forward by the defenders were more advanced than before the attack had broken. Those posts which had been overwhelmed in the morning were found to have perished most gloriously, for, in almost every case, the British dead were ringed round with the bodies of their assailants. Among the many epics of these isolated posts none is more glorious than that of a platoon of the 17th Fusiliers under the two company officers, Captain Stone and Lieutenant Benzeery, both mentioned in despatches, who fought absolutely to the last man in order to give time for the main body behind them to get ready for the assault. The official report of the officer commanding says: "The rear-guard was seen fighting with bayonet, bullet, and bomb to the last. There was no survivor." The annals of war can give few finer examples of military virtue.
Another splendid epic had been furnished by the posts of the 1st Berkshire Battalion, upon the right of the Second Division. They were all drawn from one company under the command of Lieutenant Valentin. The Germans surged in upon them in the afternoon, and there was a most grim and terrible fight. Three of the posts were destroyed, but when the ground was regained it was difficult to find the British bodies on account of the piles of German dead which were heaped round and over them. Six other posts remained intact after six hours of close fighting, in which they were continually attacked by superior numbers who tell in heaps before the steady fire of these experienced soldiers. Rapid-fire had been brought to perfection by the training system of the Second Division, and its general was justified of his wisdom. The six weary posts which remained intact after the storm had passed are said to have killed no fewer than five hundred of their assailants.
The 47th London Territorial Division, upon the right, had endured a similar experience to that of their regular comrades of the Second Division, and the 140th Brigade, upon the left, had been particularly strongly engaged. The 6th London Rifles and the 15th Civil Service Rifles held the post of honour, and the conditions were much the same as those already described, save that the field of fire was more restricted. In the afternoon attack a gap was formed between these two battalions, but was quickly closed by one of those heterogeneous musters of signallers, orderlies, and general utility men who have so often done good and unobtrusive service — silent supers who suddenly spring into the limelight, play the part of the hero, and then fade away to the wings once more. This attack of the afternoon fell with great force upon the right unit of the division, the 141st Brigade, who lay in their gas-masks half poisoned with mephitic vapours among the brushwood of Bourlon Forest. These fine troops, the London Irish, Poplar, St. Pancras, and Blackheath Battalions, endured all that gun or gas could do, and held their whole line intact until the livening.
The Results.
So ended the swaying fortunes of the hard-fought and dramatic battle, beginning with a surprise attack of the British upon the Germans, and ending by an attack of the Germans upon the British, which, if not a surprise to the commanders, at least produced some surprising and untoward results. The balance of these varied actions was greatly in favour of the British, and yet it could not be denied that something of the glory and satisfaction of Byng's splendid original victory were dimmed by this unsatisfactory epilogue. On the balance in ground gained the British had a solid grip of eleven thousand yards of the famous Hindenburg Line, as against an unimportant British section between Vendhuille and Gonnelieu. In prisoners the British had eleven thousand as against six thousand claimed by the Germans. In guns, the British took or destroyed one hundred and forty-five against one hundred taken or destroyed by their enemies. In the larger field of strategy the whole episode was fruitful, as it stopped all reinforcement of the Germans in Italy during the critical weeks while the Italians were settling down upon the line of the Piave. One result of the action was a reorganization of the British machine-gun system, which was found to have acted in an unequal fashion during the operations, some formations giving excellent results while others were less satisfactory.