The British Campaign in France (october 1918)
| << 17/21 The British Campaign in France | The British Campaign in France 19/21 >> |
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 280)
The Battle of Arras is the 18th article, published in october 1918, in a series of 21 articles written by Arthur Conan Doyle serialized as The British Campaign in France in The Strand Magazine.
Editions
- in The Strand Magazine (october 1918 [UK]) (1 ill. + 1 map + 1 diagram)
- in The British Campaign in France and Flanders (1916-1920, Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. [UK])
- in The British Campaign in France and Flanders (1916, George H. Doran Co. [US])
- in The British Campaign in Europe (1914-1918) (november 1928, Geoffrey Bles [UK])
Illustrations
-
Order of Battle — Arras, April 9, 1917. -
Scene of the operations described in the present instalment. -
Village-fighting in the great German push
The Battle of Arras
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 280)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 281)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 282)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 283)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 284)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 285)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 286)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 287)
(The Strand Magazine, october 1918, p. 288)
The Greatest British Victory in Three Years.
By
A. CONAN DOYLE.
Chapter I.
A German Miscalculation — The Advance of Snow's Seventh Corps — Advance of Haldane's Sixth Corps — The Advance of Fergusson's Seventeenth Corps — Advance of Byng's Canadian Corps — The Results of the Battle — The Aftermath of the Battle — A Great Fight.
Whilst the German, line was falling back to its new positions, and the Allies were eagerly following it across the ravished countryside until the increased resistance and the familiar lines of barbed wire warned them that the immediate retreat had come to an end, Sir Douglas Haig had managed without relaxing his pursuit to collect a strong striking force at the point of junction between the new German line and the old. The blow which he contemplated was no small local advance, but was a very wide movement extending from the neighbourhood of Lens in the north to Arras in the south, a front of more than twelve miles. Upon this sector a tremendous concentration of artillery had been effected, and four corps were waiting the signal for the assault, the three southern ones forming Allenby's Third Army, while the fourth or northern one was the right-hand corps of Home's First Army. The southern corps were the Seventh (Snow), which operated to the south of Arras, having Croisilles for its southern boundary ; the Sixth (Haldane), which advanced due east from Arras, with the Scarpe for its northern boundary ; the Seventeenth (Fergusson), which had its right on the Scarpe and its left on Thelus, with its front facing the three spurs which form this end of the Vimy Ridge; and, finally, the Canadian Corps (Byng), which faced this long and sinister slope, the scene of so much bloodshed in the past. Each corps was marshalled with three divisions in front and one in reserve, so that there were roughly one hundred and twenty thousand men in the storming line, with forty thousand advancing behind them. The Eighteenth Corps (Maxse) was in reserve in the rear of the Third Army, while the Thirteenth Corps (McCracken) was behind the First Army. The Germans had six divisions, the Eleventh Prussian, Fourteenth Bavarian, First Bavarian Reserve, and the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Seventy-ninth Reserve in the line. Their guns also were numerous, as subsequent captures were to prove; but it is probable that an extension of the Hindenburg retreat was in contemplation, and that some of the heavy artillery was already on the move.
A German Miscalculation.
The German strategists had imagined that by withdrawing their troops over a long front they would throw out of gear all the preparation of the Allies for their spring offensive. What they did actually do was to save their force in the Gommecourt peninsula from being cut off, which would surely have been their fate had they waited. But in the larger issue they proved to be singularly ill-informed, for they had stayed their retreat at the very points of the line on which the offensive had been prepared, so that the plans of attack were neither modified nor delayed. That this is true is evident, since such tremendous blows as Arras in the north and Rheims in the south could not possibly have been delivered had the preparations only begun after the Hindenburg retreat.
One of the most difficult problems of this attack was how to arrange it upon that section which was covered by the town of Arras. It is true that the German line was one thousand seven hundred yards east of the market-place; but the suburbs extended right up to it, and it was fringed with houses. The town itself, in which the storming troops must assemble and through which all supports and supplies must pass, was full of narrow streets within easy range of the German guns, and previous French guns. That last blue line so far forward upon the map has been the cause of many a rebuff. experience had proved that each exit was so carefully and accurately barraged by the German fire that it was most difficult for the troops to debouch from it. The extreme difficulties caused by the formidable defensive preparations of the enemy were fully realized, but everything which human forethought could suggest had been done to meet them. Above all, two great lessons taught by the Somme experience had been thoroughly assimilated: the one, that the broader the attack the more successful it is likely to be, as it prevents a concentration of the German guns upon a single area; the other, that it is wiser, even in the heat of battle and the glow of victory, to limit your objective to an area which is well within the range of your guns. That last blue line so far forward upon the map has been the cause of many a rebuff.
The British bombardment, which came in gusts during the days preceding the attack, did enormous damage to the German defences. The evidence of prisoners showed that for several days they had been reduced to their emergency rations. The wire, which in places was a hundred yards thick, was mostly destroyed in the first line, and greatly damaged in the second, though in the third it was found to be largely intact, save upon the left of the line. The space between the first and second German lines was roughly five hundred yards. Between the second and third was about three thousand. On April 8th there was a severe gas bombardment from four-inch trench mortars. Finally, in the early morning of April 8th, came the fearful whirlwind of fire, which was the prelude to the attack. Some idea of its intensity may be gathered from the fact that the number of guns was so great that they could have rubbed wheels from end to end of the line had they been so placed. At five-thirty the word was given, and in the· first dim grey of a rainy, windy, and sleety morning, the infantry dashed forward to the attack — "wave after wave of grimy, mud-covered, determined men, with hearts of steel and as light as feathers," to use the words of one of them. The events may best be described from the south of the line as being the nearest to Arras from which the battle derives its name.
The Advance of Snow's Seventh Corps.
Snow's Seventh Corps had the Twenty-first North Country Division upon the extreme right, the Thirtieth Lancashire Division in the centre, the Fifty-sixth London on their left, and the Fourteenth Light Division upon the extreme northern wing. The soldiers, soaked to the skin, with the rain beating upon their backs, and their feet ankle-deep in the mud, set about their task in a slow, calm, business like fashion which would take no denial. No village or notable fixed points lay in their path, but they plodded without a check or halt over the first entrenchments, finding no very strong resistance, save at one point upon the left of their line, and suffering little loss from the German artillery. Considerable numbers of the enemy were found scattered in their shattered trenches or covering in the dug-outs. Over a thousand of these were sent to the rear.
Taking them in turn from the south we shall just follow the fortunes of the North countrymen of the Twenty-first Division. This division upon this day was not expected to do more than make a strong demonstration, because both it and to a less extent the division upon its left, had in front of it sheets of uncut wire and all the devilries of the fixed German line. The object, therefore, was that they should make a holding attack, in the hope that the northern divisions of the corps should gcj well forward to the east, and then swing to the south in such a way as to make the German position untenable. This was eventually done, and a way was cleared so that the two divisions in the south should be able to advance with the remainder of the line. The whole operation of the Seventh Corps has to be continually judged by the fact that they were on the edge of the abandoned area, and that therefore their southern front bulged out to the east in a way which brought the successive divisions almost into an echelon formation.
On the left of the Twenty-first Division were the Lancashire Pals of the Thirtieth Division. Upon April 8th they had made a good start, as the 2nd Bedfords carried the village of St. Martin-de-Cojeul, an outlying point of the German line, but on the same date the 21st Brigade was held up in an attempt to advance upon the left. On the 9th, the day of battle, they went forward again, the 21st on the left, the 89th Brigade on the right. The first dash behind a splendid barrage was most promising, but the 21st Brigade ran into uncut sheets of wire and was held, the 18th King's Liverpools suffering severely. The brigade upon the right managed to get forward, but it also was faced eventually with the same obstacle. The attack was renewed two days later with the aid of four Tanks, but the wire was still impassable, though the infantry tried again and again. Finally, however, the Fifty-sixth Division having cleared its own front, sent the Victoria Rifles bombing down the front of the Thirtieth Division, who. having surmounted their own obstacles, cleared in turn the front of the Twenty-first Division upon the right, and so by the evening of April 11th the line was finally advanced.
To the Fifty-sixth Division, the next upon the north, was assigned the capture of Neuville Vitasse and the strong works which surrounded it. The advance was carried out at seven-forty-live — the zero time was earlier as it travelled up the line — and was led by the 167th Brigade upon the right and by the 168th Brigade upon the left, while the 169th were in support. "The bombardment and the covering fire were magnificent" says one who marched in the ranks. "I almost felt sorry for the poor old Hun, only, after all, he is such a Hun." The main fighting was on the right, where the 3rd London and 8th Middlesex stormed the main portion of the village. At ten-thirty all the eastern portion had been secured, and the 1st London moved forward to take the Cojeul Switch line. Unfortunately, they struck up against uncut wire, and a very heavy belt of fire. Colonel Smith, the commanding officer, and the great majority of the other officers were killed or wounded, and the advance was brought to a stand. The 18th Liverpools, of the 21st Brigade, upon the right had also been halted by the uncut wire. The Colonel of the 7th Middlesex took local command of this difficult situation so far as it affected the advance of his brigade, and threw his battalion in to strengthen the 1st Londons, so that together they captured the Cojeul Switch trench. The Londoners were then well ahead of the Liverpool men upon their right, so the 1st London threw back a defensive flank while the 7th Middlesex stormed forward against the powerful Ibex trench. Three separate attempts were made. much impeded by the deep mud, and all ending in failure, so that darkness fell before the task had been accomplished, but with true British tenacity, at 3 a.m., in the darkest hour before dawn, the Middlesex men tried once more and carried Ibex, taking a number of prisoners. The 168th Brigade had with varying fortunes kept pace upon the left, and in the early morning the London Scottish on its right were in touch with Ibex trench.
The position of the 167th was still dangerous upon the flank, as it was always ahead of its southern neighbours, so that instead of advancing eastwards the London Scottish now turned south, their depleted ranks being strengthened by the 9th London (Victorias) from the reserve brigade. The enemy were only forty yards off upon the flank, with a perfect warren of trenches, and the mud was so dreadful that some men who got in could hardly be dragged out again alive. In spite of every difficulty the Londoners, after an initial check, swept triumphantly down Ibex and Zoo trenches, clearing in one wild. glorious rush the whole position, capturing one hundred and ninety-seven more prisoners of the 31st Prussian Regiment, with several machine-guns. Captain Cousens, who led this charge. after being badly wounded, was unhappily killed by a sniper in the moment of victory. The Victorias joined in the victorious charge and he! ped to hold and to extend what had been won. The general effect of the advance of this division was to turn the flank of the southern German defences and to open up a road for the Thirtieth and Twenty-first Divisions upon the right.
The Fourteenth Light Division, to the north of the Londoners, was faced by the slight slope and formidable defences of Telegraph Hill. They went forward with the 42nd Brigade upon the left and the 43rd upon the right. Their performance during the day was a particularly fine one, and they not only rushed the strong position of Telegraph Hill, but they carried the British line to a point well to the east of it. Their whole advance was largely regulated by the situation upon their northern flank, and they were exposed to such an enfilade fire whenever they got at all ahead that they found it impossible to act entirely upon their own.
Upon the left of the front was a strong German position called "The Harp," which was very gallantly carried by the 42nd Brigade. Sixteen tanks which were to have lent a hand in this difficult operation failed for some reason to arrive in time, and the infantry had to advance with no help save their own stout hearts. The attack was carried out by the 9th K.R.R., with the 4th Royal Fusiliers of the Third Division acting upon their left, and their comrades of the 5th Oxford and Bucks upon their right. Their only serious opponents here, as elsewhere, were snipers and machine-gunners; but these were all of the best, and caused heavy losses before the whole objective with its garrison had been captured. By a quarter past nine in the morning it was entirely in British hands, and as the day wore on the division kept steadily improving their position, though still short of their final objective, that elusive red line which is so easy to draw and so hard to attain. In the evening an attempt was made by the Fourteenth Division, still acting with the Sixth Corps upon the left, to struggle still farther eastwards. This advance had no success, and so the forward units of the whole Seventh Corps dug in on the general line from Feuchy Chapel road in the north to near Croiselles in the south, having after a desperate day's fighting achieved a gain which averaged two or three miles, and having taken a total of nearly two thousand prisoners with a number of guns. Concerning these prisoners it may be unsafe to generalize, but it is certain that many of them surrendered very readily. As to their general type, the opinion of a commanding officer who handled many of them may be quoted: "The officers were mild persons, none of the bullet-headed, bristly-moustached, truculent Prussian type. The prisoners generally do not inspire one with respect. Braggarts and bullies in prosperity, in adversity they cringe."
Advance of Haldane's Sixth Corps.
Haldane's Sixth Corps was to the immediate left of the Seventh, and its operations were directed due cast of Arras. The three front divisions, counting from the south, were the Third Regulars, the Twelfth South of England, and the Fifteen Scottish, with the Thirty-seventh English in reserve.
The right of the attacking line was formed by the 76th Brigade of the Third Division, a unit which had distinguished itself greatly in previous fighting. The 8th and 9th Brigades were in close support. Its front was south of the Arras-Cambrai road. To the left of the 76th Brigade the line was carried on by the 37th and 36th Brigades of the Twelfth Division. Their right rested on the Arras — Cambrai road. To their left were the 44th and 45th of the Fifteenth Division. Their left rested upon the Scarpe. Nothing could have gone more smoothly than the advance, which kept well up with the barrage. Only at Observation Hill was vigorous resistance encountered, and the German barrage was so belated that it fell upon empty trenches after the stormers had left them. To the courage which had always been their birthright the infantry now added all the cool war-wisdom which experience of many battles must bring with it, and all those devices for overcoming the scattered forts of the enemy and avoiding their machine-guns which had been learned on the Somme and the Ancre were now practised to keep down the losses of the assault.
The advance of the 76th Brigade had been to the south of the great high road which leads from Arras to Cambrai. The 1st Gordons led the attack and took the front line with a number of the Prussian 38th Regiment. The 10th Welsh Fusiliers then passed through the ranks of the Highlanders and captured Devil's Wood. So swift were these movements that the German barrage was always in the rear. Having thus secured the first objective, the 9th Brigade, strengthened by the 2nd Suffolks, stormed forward to the next line of defence. The 4th Royal Fusiliers on the right took Nomeny, Spring, and Lynx trenches, when the Suffolks passed through them and took Neuilly trench. The 12th West Yorkshires took Tilloy village. The 13th Liverpool, after being held up on the left, carried the line forward, and by getting its machine-gun on to the roof of Tilloy Château dominated the country to the extreme discomfort of the German snipers. Besides these numerous trenches and strong points, the 9th Brigade captured a larga German redoubt, an exploit in which they were much assisted by a couple of Tanks. Here a considerable number of prisoners were made, including most of a battalion of the 162nd Regiment, together with its commander.
It will save confusion if we follow the fortunes of each division for the day, regardless of what is going on upon its flank, as it is impossible to understand a narrative which switches continually from one portion of the line to another. The whole operation of the Sixth Corps was somewhat behind the time appointed, as each division had met with some delays, but the advance towards — the third objective was begun about one o'clock in this southern area. The 8th Brigade had now taken up the running, and the 9th had fallen into support. Reinforced by the two reserve battalions of the 76th Brigade, the victorious advance was resumed, the 2nd Royal Scots and 7th Shropshires carrying the Bois des Boeufs to the south of the Cambrai road, together with five guns which had been concealed in it. To those who had experienced what the capture of a wood meant in the Somme fighting it was indeed a promise for the future that this considerable plantation. should offer so slight a resistance. The 8th Brigade fought its way onwards for another μrile or more until it bad attained the line of Feuchy Chapel. Here the German resistance had thickened and the artillery fire had increased in the same ratio as that of the British had. weakened. A halt was called, therefore, and the infantry consolidated their advanced position. An attempt by the. Gordons and the 8th Royal Lancasters to reach the extreme final objective was checked in the evening by a very heavy fire upon both flanks.
In the centre the Twelfth Division had met with strong resistance at several points, which caused the assault to fall behind the barrage. These centres of German resistance were usually isolated houses or small redoubts, so that it was possible in many cases to mask them and to push onwards. No village or large fixed defence lay in their path, and in spite of a check for some, time at the estaminet upon the Cambrai road, they were able to line up with their comrades to the south upon the second objective about half-past twelve o'clock. At this point the 35th Brigade passed through the advanced lines and moved to the front. A number of difficult positions were taken, including Observation Hill, and the ground was so thoroughly cleared that the assailants were able to go forward with the assurance that their wounds would not. be in the back. It was found, however as they neared the line of the third German position that considerable stretches of wire had been imperfectly cut, and that the machine-gun. fire was so severe as to make the final assault impossible. The infantry dug in, therefore, and waited for further support from the guns, many of which were already on the move. The 9th Essex upon the right actually reached the Feuchy Chapel work and held their grip of it, keeping in line with the 8th Brigade upon the south.
The Fifteenth Division to the north of the corps' front had before them the very strong position called the "Railway Triangle," where the line to Lens branches away from the line to Douai. This formidable place was attacked by the Scotch infantry, and after a very severe struggle it was captured about half-past eleven, save for its eastern side, which was finally taken later in the morning, the artillery aiding the assailants by some extraordinarily good shooting.
The advance was then resumed, and the division found itself shortly after noon in the line of the second objective. Six brigades of field artillery had followed closely upon the heels of the infantry and managed, in spite of the unfavourable state of the ground, to take up a position to cover the further attack. When one recalls the dreadful weather and the shell-pocked state of the countryside, it was a remarkable feat upon the part of the gun-teams to get their pieces so rapidly forward. Several Tanks came forward also, and did good work, not only upon this front but at Tilloy
The Fifteenth Division was now somewhat behind the others, but shortly after two o'clock the 40th lowland Brigade advanced upon the third objective. These splendid soldiers brushed aside every obstacle, and when fired upon at short range by German guns they rushed onwards with a yell and captured the battery. By 4 p.m. they had fully reached their final line and had pushed out their patrols some hundreds of yards to the eastwards. This fine advance, which was the only one to reach the extreme limit upon this front, was carried out by the 7th Scots Borderers, 10th Scots Rifles, and 10-11th Highland Light Infantry.
The Thirty-seventh Division, composed entirely of English troops, north, south, and midland, had moved up in the rear of the fighting line, and in the middle of the afternoon it found itself in the German second-line system; while the corps' mounted troops had pushed forward on the heels of the Fifteenth Division as far as the Railway Triangle. As evening fell the Thirty-seventh Division pushed forward with the intention of reaching the extreme point attained by the Fifteenth Division, and then swinging to the right in the hope of capturing Monchy. The advance seems, however, to have taken a direction rather too much to the south, with the result that instead of finding the opening made by the 46th Brigade they came upon the more contracted Feuchy line, held by the Twelfth and Third Divisions. Here they were held up by a field of wire, as their comrades had already been, and the two brigades concerned — the 111th upon the left and the 112th upon the right — remained in line with the 35th and the 8th Brigades, the units being considerably intermingled. The 63rd Brigade, however, which was now a brigade of the Thirty-seventh Division, though the reader will associate it with the Twenty-first Division in the past, was able to keep its true direction, and before night had finally established itself at the north end of Orange Hill, well up to the third objective and in touch with the 46th Brigade. The corps cavalry also pushed forward along the south bank of the Scarpe, capturing three eight-inch howitzers upon the way, and halting opposite Fampoux, where they were in touch with the Fourth Division upon the northern bank of the river. Such was the splendid day's work of Haldane's corps. It is true that in the south the uncut wire had made it impossible for him to reach his ultimate objective, but he had in the space of the one Easter day captured the villages of Feuchy and of Tilloy, gained some thirty-six square miles of ground, and taken two thousand prisoners with sixty guns. It was a most notable achievement. We shall now pause on the evening of this first day of battle and we shall go back to reconstruct the operations upon the northern bank of the Scarpe.
The Advance of Ferguson's Seventeenth Corps.
The Seventeenth Corps (Fergusson) was upon the left of the 6th. Its right-hand unit, the Ninth Division, consisting of two Scottish and one South African Brigade, was operating upon the immediate north of the Scarpe. This division was to attack with three brigades in line, the 26th on the right, 27th on the left, and South Africans between. Upon the left of the 9th was the Thirty-fourth Division, drawn largely from Scotland and Tyneside, the same fine division which had been the very pivot upon which the battle of July 1st had turned. Upon the left of the corps was the Fifty-first Highland Territorial Division, which had distinguished itself so greatly at Beaumont Hamel five months before. It may be said, therefore, that the fighting line of the Seventeenth Corps upon this great day was predominantly Scottish, but the veteran Fourth Division was in immediate support. There were no villages over the greater part of the front, but there were great numbers of fortified farms and strong posts of every description, besides the usual lines of wired trenches. The ground was in successive ridges, and a big tactical obstacle existed in the Lens-Arras Railroad in its alternate cuttings and embankments. The long, eager line of Highlanders, Tynesiders, and South Africans rolled over every obstacle, and by ten o'clock had mastered all its first objectives, which were the three lines of German trenches. In the south, the Ninth Division had carried first Blangy and then Athies by storm. There was a time when the 26th Brigade upon the right was hung up, but with fine initiative the right flank of the Transvaal Regiment worked down along the railway cutting and helped to clear the front of its neighbours. In the centre, the Thirty-fourth Division, after a short check at a network of trenches called "The Pump," had reached its allotted positions. In the north, the clansmen, who, as Territorials, were sprung from the very soil of the Highlands, had swiftly advanced to the south of Thelus, and had covered the right wing of the 1st Canadians while they captured that village. It was victory all along the line, and victory without those excessive losses which have made many of our greatest successes as tragic as they were glorious. The artillery barrage had been found to be a powerful antidote against the deadly machine-guns. "When our barrage lifted off the railway cutting, the machine-guns had been silenced and all the gunners were found to be dead." Such was the report of a South African officer.
Allusion has been made to the check caused by the strong point called "The Pump" and the trenches called the Kleemanstellung just east of it. Some detail should be added in this matter, for it retarded the attack of the flanks of two divisions, and the delay caused by it had the effect that the Canadians on the left and the Ninth upon the right were farther forward in the late afternoon than part of the Fifty-first and the Thirty-fourth, which might have caused a dangerous situation. The Thirty-fourth Division had advanced upon a three brigade front, which consisted from the south of the 101st, the 102nd, and 103rd. On the north of the 103rd was the 152nd Brigade of the Fifty-first Division, with the Seaforths as the flank battalion. This pestilent strong point, armed with well-served and well-concealed machine-guns, lay between the two brigades and held up the flanks of both, inflicting considerable losses not only on the Seaforths, but on the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers, who were on the left of the Thirty-fourth Division. For a considerable time the advance was held. The 27th reserve battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers were sent up, and one of its companies, led with a fine mixture of valour and cunning, carried the place by storm. The whole line then got forward, but the losses had been heavy, including Colonel Hermon, of the 24th Northumberland Fusiliers. In the evening it was found that the final objective had not yet been fully attained at this quarter of the field, for it had been marked at a farm called Maison de la Côte, from which the front line was still a thousand yards distant. A brilliant little attack, however, by the 103rd Brigade (supplemented by a battalion from the 152nd Brigade) in the early morning of April 10th captured the whole position. Besides the check at The Pump, there had been another on the Fifty-first divisional front at a post called the "Deutsche Haus." The consequence of this was a loss of the barrage and a delay which led to the isolated left of the Fifty-first losing direction entirely and wandering round in a half-circle. The circumstances were so complex that I not until next morning that they could be cleared up. Had the Germans had the spirit for a counter-attack, they would certainly have found a considerable gap in the line.
These events were in the northern area of the Seventeenth Corps. In the southern portion, at about eleven o'clock, the reserve division came forward passing through the weary ranks of the Ninth, pushed on along the northern bank of the river. The advance had already been a splendid one, the Ninth Division having two thousand prisoners to its credit, but this movement of the Fourth Division against an enemy who was already badly shaken was a very fruitful one. The 12th Brigade was nearest the Scarpe, with the 11th upon the left, while the 10th moved forward in close support. Two obstacles faced the division, the straggling village of Fampoux upon the bank of the river, and the Hyderabad Redoubt, a considerable fort to the north of the village. The 12th Brigade moved swiftly forward in the nearest approach to open warfare that had been seen for years. The 1st Royal Lancasters were on the right of the swift flexible line, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers in the centre, and the 2nd Essex upon the left. The brigade fought its way in the teeth of a very hot fire to the outskirts of Fampoux, where the reserve battalion, the 2nd West Ridings, passed through the King's Own, and carried the village in splendid style late in the evening at the point of the bayonet. It is a remarkable fact that the wire in front of the village had not been cut by the artillery, and the infantry passed in single file through the gaps in it, after disposing of the only German machine-gunner who offered resistance. At the same time, the nth Brigade kept pace upon their left flank — the 1st Hampshires to the left and Somersets to the right, while the 1st Rifle Brigade, passing through them, rushed the strong position of the Hyderabad Redoubt, and the 1st East Lancashires formed a defensive flank. Communication was at once opened across the Scarpe with Haldane's Corps upon the south side. By this fine advance of the Fourth Division, the right of the Seventeenth Corps had got considerably farther forward than the left, so that a defensive line had to be formed sloping back from this advanced point to the third line German trenches. Such was the position upon the evening of the first day of battle. Meanwhile, three thousand five hundred prisoners with fifty captured guns testified to the success of the Seventeenth Corps.
Advance of Byng's Canadian Corps.
We must now turn to the splendid achievement of the Canadian Corps upon the left. The reputation of the Canadians as brilliant soldiers, as dashing in attack as they were steady in defence, had already been solidly established by a long series of military feats, beginning with the ever-memorable second Battle of Ypres and continuing on to the capture of Courcelette and the fine fighting of the Somme. Hitherto they had acted in comparatively small bodies, but now the whole might of Canada was drawn together in the four fine divisions which lay facing the historic Vimy Ridge — a long, gradual slope which reaches a height of more than four hundred and fifty feet at the summit. They were arranged in their numerical order from the south, the first being in touch with the Fifty-first British Division, while the Fourth had upon its left Holland's First Corps, which was not engaged in the first day's operations. The front covered by the Canadians was from the south end of the ridge to the Souchez River, close to Lens. Nothing could have been more magnificent or more successful than their advance, the Second and Third Divisions attaining their full objectives at every point, and the First doing the same after a short check. There was no rebuff save in the extreme north of the line. Sweeping onwards with irresistible fury, they overran three lines of German trenches, including the famous La Folie farm, captured the village of Farbus, and secured the splendid total of seventy officers and three thousand five hundred men as prisoners — the same number as were taken by their British comrades to the immediate south. They not only crowned the redoubtable ridge, but they made their way down the eastern slope and established their line beyond it. Many of the German infantry were captured in the great chalk excavations in which they had taken refuge, two large tunnels in particular — the Volker and the Prinz Arnault tunnels — being crammed with men. Incredible incidents happened in these subterranean burrows, where small bodies of Canadian moppers-up were faced suddenly by large numbers of armed Germans in hiding. In one well-authenticated case four Canadians bluffed and captured four officers and one hundred and twenty-three men from a Bavarian corps. who were found in such a pocket. When the Kaiser in prophetic mood had spoken about what would happen when his Bavarians met the British, such an incident was far from his thoughts. It should be mentioned that the fifth British Division was in close support of the Canadians, and that the 13th Brigade of this division was incorporated with the Second Canadians upon that day. It was used in conjunction with the 6th Canadian Brigade on its right to take the final objectives, the eastern slopes of the ridge, just north of Farbus Wood, which they did successfully with alight 1osses.
During the night of April 9th-10th there was fighting at several points, notably at the north end of the Vimy Ridge. Here the Fourth Canadian Division had some difficulty in holding its ground against several strong counter-attacks of the Germans. It is probable that no body of troops in the whole battle had a harder task, or stuck to it more tenaciously, than this Fourth Canadian Division. Hill 145, which was an outlier of the ridge, was very strongly held and desperately defended, so that it would have turned any but first-class troops. The final clearing of this point was effected upon April 10th, and led to further operations in conjunction with British troops to the north.
The Results of the Battle.
The second day of the Battle of Arras, April 10th, was spent partly in the consolidation of the ground gained and partly in increasing the area now occupied. The troops were in high heart, for although the full extent of the victory had not yet been realized, it was already known that at least ten thousand prisoners and one hundred guns had fallen into our hands, figures which showed that the battle had been the most serious military disaster which had yet befallen the enemy. A fuller enumeration taken some days later gave thirteen thousand men, three howitzers, twenty-eight heavy guns, one hundred and thirty field-guns, eighty-four trench-mortars, and two hundred and fifty machineguns as the total capture. It may be mentioned that over one thousand prisoners were taken from six different German divisions, which disposes of their mendacious assertion that only two divisions occupied their front. It was certainly the greatest blow delivered by the British Army up to that date. and the only other day's fighting at all comparable in its results was the French attack upon the Champagne front on September 25th, 1915, where the number of prisoners was greater but the capture of guns was less.
The Battle of Arras may be considered as having been in truth a one-day battle in the same sense as the succeeding Battle of Messines, for in each case the attack was delivered in order to gain a definite objective, which was the ridge from which observation could be obtained. The extreme limit of advance had not, however, been reached either in the south or in the north, and so in both these areas hard fighting continued, due partly to the efforts of the British to enlarge their gains and partly to the rally of the Germans and their attempts at counter-attack. There was no concentration of troops or guns, however, upon the side of the British, and no attempt at any considerable advance.
The Aftermath of the Battle.
In the Seventh Corps, to the south, the Fifty-sixth Division of London Territorials had (as already described) enlarged the area which it had taken the day before in the Neuville Vitasse sector. The general curve of the line is such that it was not possible for the units of the Seventh Corps to get forward until the Sixth Corps to the north had won some ground; but upon the afternoon of the 12th a very fine advance was made, by which the Twenty-first Division stormed Wancourt and Heninel. The Cojeul River was crossed by the Fourteenth Light Division, and the heights upon the eastern bank were occupied. This brought the left flank of the Seventh Corps up to the right flank of the Sixth Corps, and ensured close co-operation in the operations to the north. This storming of the German position in this section was the more important as the troops were faced by the new Hindenburg Line. It was well known that an alternative line from Drocourt to Queant existed some miles to the eastward, but none the less the fall of the front section at a period when much of its wire was still intact proved to the Germans how impossible it was to hold on British troops by mere passive obstacles. The Tanks were of great assistance in this difficult operation.
During the night of April 10th the Twelfth Division was withdrawn into reserve, and the advance was resumed in the early morning by the remaining divisions and the cavalry. At 5 a.m. the infantry was closing in upon Monchy under a heavy fire. The line of advance extended right across the Cambrai Road, the 76th Brigade finding itself opposite to the village of Guémappe. Here they were exposed to a very heavy fire of machine-guns, and this famous brigade sustained heavy losses, which were increased by a second attempt to get forward in the afternoon. The 76th Brigade finally entrenched itself some half a mile to the west of Guémappe and waited for developments. The 8th Royal Lancasters were particularly hard hit in their attack.
In the meantime, the Thirty-seventh Division had advanced directly upon Monchy, and after severe fighting, in which the splendid infantry struggled onwards in the face of every possible difficulty of German resistance and of driving snow-storms, the place was carried by assault. The three regiments of cavalry from the 7th Brigade — the 3rd Dragoon Guards, loth Hussars, and Essex Yeomanry — advanced at a gallop and did splendid service by taking part in the attack and by helping to consolidate the village. By nine o'clock in the morning the infantry, greatly aided by a very active and efficient Tank, had driven their way to the farthest houses upon the eastern side; About one hundred and fifty of the garrison remained in their hands, while very many lay dead among the ruins of the shattered buildings. The cavalry emerged on the eastern side of the village and lost heavily at that point, especially in horses, some five hundred of which were hit.
A Great Fight.
As no large movement was contemplated upon Haldane's front, it was now held by only two divisions, the Twenty-ninth to the south and the Seventeenth to the north, covering the whole broad area from the north of the Cojeul River to the south of the Scarpe. At five-thirty upon April 14th both divisions advanced in order to test the German strength and if possible, to push them farther back from Monchy. It was an unsuccessful day, and yet it was one of those failures which will be remembered when facile successes have been forgotten, for it brought with it one episode which elicited in the highest degree the historical qualities of British infantry. It had been arranged that the 88th Brigade, consisting of the 2nd Hants, 4th Worcesters, 1st Essex, and the Newfoundland Regiment, should attack due east of Monchy, while another brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division should advance to their right, and the Seventeenth Division guard their flank upon the left. Both of the flank attacks failed, however, and the result was that the storming line of the 88th Brigade, consisting of the Essex men on the left and the Newfoundlanders on the right, found themselves in possession of the German trenches on Infantry Hill, east of Monchy, but with both wings exposed and with so terrible a barrage behind them that they were practically cut off from assistance. This might have mattered little in ordinary circumstances, since two such battalions might be counted upon to hold their ground, but by an evil chance their advance had coincided with a considerable German counter-attack from the Bois du Sart, made by a whole Bavarian division with the intention of retaking Monchy. The result was a Homeric contest in which two battalions held up the whole division, shattered a considerable attack, and were practically annihilated in doing so. Of some companies not a single man returned, and yet few were ever reported as prisoners in Germany. No more gallant feat of arms has been performed in the war. The 2nd Hants and 4th Worcesters in support did their best to help their comrades, and sustained considerable losses themselves in the attempt, but they were never able to reach the real front line, and it is undoubtedly true that the two battalions alone received and broke the full strength of the Bavarian division, which was entirely fresh, having taken no part in any previous fighting.
It was difficult in the barrage and confusion — the ground being unreconnoitred — to direct reinforcements to the points where they were so urgently needed, but an officer of the Essex passed through the German barrage and managed to bring up one company of the 2nd Hants, who came too late to retrieve the fight, but were able to take up the defence of the northern flank and to prevent the Germans from getting round in that quarter. Small parties of the enemy got up to the fringes of the village, but the edge had been taken completely from their assault, and in spite of the heavy barrage the staff of the brigade headquarters. who were the only troops available, were sufficient to hold them off. No German set foot in Monchy. Of the headquarter staff there were only nine survivors, each of whom was decorated.
